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1. What did people vote for?

The choice of vote is one of the hardest tasks an individual has to perform and not only within the framework of political activities. The issues are complex, the bulk of information to master is huge, the time available is little, the interest is sometimes moderate and the cognitive capacities are not always adequate. Under these conditions, for a long time, the choices of the voting citizen of democratic countries have been guided by the «cues» coming from their belonging to well-defined social groups, be them real or virtual (under the guise of reference groups, for example). These indications constituted « cognitive shortcuts» used to simplify a complex reality and eventually come to a decision. Thus, the belonging to a given ethnic group, a religious confession or a social class was indicated by the earliest scholars (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, Berelson et al. 1954) as the main determining factor for the vote. Later, this explanation of the voting behaviour was replaced by another assumption based on the role played by the psychological identification with a political party (Campbell et al. 1960). The social and political structuring of the voting decision therefore explained the stability and the continuity of citizens’ vote in democratic countries.
Since the early Seventies at least, an important change of perspective took place, following the rising «mobility» of the electorate of most Western countries (Butler and Stokes 1970. Crewe 1985). This was caused by various factors and long-term phenomena, from the lessening of class cleavages to the diminished role of party organisations and the escalating importance of television during electoral campaigns. All this has led to an increasing «individualisation» of voting behaviour: in fact, the voting decisions of a considerable section of electors have become more flexible. This variability of voting choices may be ascribed, as the case may be, to the campaign issues, the performance of the retiring government or the candidates’ image. All this is conveyed, if not even influenced, by the media, and television in particular.
This, in a nutshell, is the international framework. Now, within this framework, where do Italian voters stand? The underlying question this paper aims to answer is: in the 2001 elections, what mechanisms did the voter’s choice result from? Naturally, by this we do not mean the explanatory factors of the voting behaviour; the focus is, more specifically, on which “objects” counted the most in the citizens’ voting decision. In other words, we are not asking who, but what people voted for. Using a cognitivist perspective, we are therefore asking which « information shortcuts» Italian voters use to come to their decision on who to vote for, what they are guided by to get their bearings in the complex world of politics.
In this perspective, the present paper shall consider and investigate a number of factors underlying the choice favouring a given political alliance rather than another: the coalition, the programme, the candidates, the coalition leader, and the favourite party. A special attention will be devoted to the role of the party and to the feeling of psychological closeness to it. Linked to this issue, the role played by the coalition identity will be considered. Finally, the candidates’ role will also be analysed.

2. The motivations of the majority vote





This is a very important consideration, because it gives us the size of the boundaries within which other more specific and contingent factors may operate. For example, there is clear evidence that the characteristics of the leaders of the two coalitions influenced the voters’ choice (Sani 2002). However, this result should be considered in the light of the fact that only one fifth of the electorate voted «for» the coalition leader. The same can be said about programme issues: although they are an important choice factor, less than one fourth of Italian voters voted «for» the programme. The distribution of voting choices – that is, of the objects of choice – is important in limiting and structuring the voter’s field of choice.




If one considers each party’s voters, rather than those of the two main coalitions, more accurate information can be obtained, as well as a clearer picture, on the complex internal composition of the electorates of the two competing coalitions.
Undoubtedly, the most interesting case here concerns Forza Italia’s voters. Their vote for the CdL was guided by Mr. Berlusconi’s leadership (36%) and by her programme (28%). Another choice factor lagging far behind appears to be the coalition. Even further behind is the political party, whereas constituency candidates come last among the elements shaping voters’ choice. By contrast, it is worth considering the very little importance that National Alliance voters appear to give to Mr Berlusconi’s image in their choice mechanism, as opposed to the emphasis placed on the coalition aspect and on their favourite political party​[3]​. 
As for the Ulivo voters, the heterogeneity of the motivations underlying their voting choice seems to be even greater. The centre-left coalition leader’s capacity to guide the choice of his electorate is irremediably lower than his opponent’s. In particular, it reaches a notable level only among the Margherita voters, whereas it ranks one but last among the voters of the Democratic Party of the Left and «others from the centre-left»​[4]​. As for the «objects » of voting choice for the Ulivo, therefore, the real unifying factor is the coalition, which, to its voters’ eyes, seems to be the authentic added value of the alliance. This goes to support the opinions of those centre-left representatives who consider the coalition as the real – and, for the time being at least – the only strength of the Ulivo. In this regard, it should be noted that Communist Refoundation voters are «forced» to highlight the importance of the coalition, since their party did not appear in the single-member constituencies for the Chamber of Deputies. It should also be added that the Margherita formation was notoriously not a political party at the time, but it was itself an aggregation / coalition of parties (Popolari, Democratici, Rinnovamento italiano, Udeur). Thus, not surprisingly, its supporters, while showing some interest for the programme, used the coalition as a main cognitive tool for their voting decision.
However, these considerations on the role of the coalition should be mediated by the role that centre-left voters - and especially the PDS (Democratic Party of the Left) ones - ascribe to their party as an element determining their choice in the plurality vote. In the mechanisms determining the voter’s choice, this evidently constitutes a factor that leads us in a totally opposite direction and relates to the still unresolved tension existing between party and coalition elements. It thus appears that centre-left party voters are more in agreement with their party officials or that, alternatively, they simply use their party as a cognitive shortcut: whatever direction their party goes, so does their vote.
One element that remains pretty much the same is the low percentage of voters from both alliances who consider their constituency candidate as an important choice factor. In the light of this percentage, one may be tempted to argue that the outrage constructed or exploited by the newspapers around the scandal of the candidati paracadutati (candidates arbitrarily made to run in constituencies where a victory of their party was guaranteed) appears to have been out of place. However, this would certainly be a much hasty, if not erroneous, conclusion. In fact, however small it may be, the percentage of voters linking their voting behaviour to the candidate appearing on their constituency ballot can be critical in several single-member constituencies.
A final consideration concerns the programme as a motivation / object. Among all possible alternatives, this is the most markedly distinctive factor, the one that almost represents a division, differentiating the various competing subjects. Among the alternatives proposed, the programme – the policies, the issues – is the one that, in theory, should imply a higher level of intellectual sophistication, political awareness and exposure to political information: it is therefore a rather complex and articulated object of the voter’s choice.
Almost one fourth of Italian voters declared that they based their choice on the «programme». This is not a high percentage and appears strikingly similar to the one recorded in the 1972 survey mentioned above. This figure is even lower than the one on the voto d’opinione (issue voting, 32%) recorded in 1990​[5]​. Finally, it should be said that policy-oriented individuals still represent a minority in the Italian political scene. This certainly helps to explain the often mentioned stability of the Italian voter’s choice in the new electoral system too. As for the programme, it is worth noticing that the Ulivo coalition voters – except for the supporters of the Margherita formation – give little importance to this factor in their voting decision. This cannot but cause some puzzlement and is probably an indication of the fact that the political proposal of the centre-left per se does not enjoy a strong and widespread support not even among its own voters (see Bellucci 2002).




Is there any individual characteristic leading voters to look for a guide to steer their choice in one or the other direction? Since the objects of choice are used by voters as cognitive shortcuts, their educational level should have a considerable influence on the factor determining the voting decision.
As shown in table 3, there are some significant connections between educational qualification and the object of the voter’s choice. In particular, the clearest connection is the one between the coalition leaders and low educational levels. The lower these levels, the higher the tendency to identify the coalition leader as the main factor determining the voter’s choice (the gap is as wide as 10 percentage points). Since we know that the leadership effect has been more significant for Mr Berlusconi than for Mr Rutelli, we can safely say that this effect has been one of the main factors of the increased tendency to vote for the CdL coalition on the part of voters with medium to low educational levels. On the contrary, voters with medium to high educational levels (from senior secondary schools upwards) tend to point to the coalition and its programme as their choice factor, although percentage gaps are not as wide as in the previous case.




If, on the other hand, we look at the voters’ occupational status, we cannot help considering housewives’ vote orientation. In fact, they played a very important role in determining the success of the CdL, and of Forza Italia in particular. Data in table 3 speak for themselves. The housewives’ percentage of choices guided by the coalition leader resulted considerably higher than those concerning other categories (especially students and employed people). In this case too, the logistic regression coefficients show that the housewives’ choice (compared to employed people, whether male or female) mainly depended upon the coalition leader. This corroborates the results obtained by other studies and the special role played by this social group in the 2001 general elections.

2.2 Cognitive mobilisation and the mass media





As for the effect of the mass media - the reading of newspapers and exposure to television - they seem to push voters in totally opposite directions. Those who read newspapers regularly and watch television for few hours a day mainly indicate the coalition as the decisive factor for their electoral choice; on the contrary, those who never read newspapers and watch television for several hours a day definitely choose the figure of the leader to pattern their voting decision.




We have seen that the voters’ favourite party still plays a substantial role in shaping electoral behaviour, however diverse it may be according to the different categories of voters. This may puzzle those who claim that parties are now not so effective in shaping and structuring the citizens’ electoral choice. 
Parties have always been considered as vital elements of the representative government, both by political theory and empirical analysis. Modern democracy would be inconceivable without them. Nowadays, the role parties play in moulding the policies of advanced industrial democracies appears to be declining. At the very least, we are witnessing a transformation of parties and of their role. This is certainly not only an Italian phenomenon, but it involves all Western countries [Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000].
At an individual level, there is an increased disaffection towards single parties and often also towards the party system as a whole. In many countries, feelings of psychological attachment to parties have waned: voters openly show and even boast their alienation from parties. Parties themselves have changed their organisation considerably, turning from instruments of mass political integration into electoral machines. The rise of new interest groups and other political intermediaries and, more recently, of new movements constitute an alternative to the parties’ traditional representation role. Moreover, the development and spreading of mass media – of television in particular – has largely replaced parties as political information vehicles.
One of the main indicators of the nature of party-based democracy is the voters’ identification with their party and, consequently, with the party-based system of government. The voter-party bond represents a measure of the vitality of the party system and, at the same time, it provides the framework within which parties, candidates and coalitions alike operate. In virtually all the political systems of Western democracies, with some differences partly due to each country’s party system (more or less stable or fluid over time) and partly to the age of parties and to the various democratic regimes, there exists a relationship of psychological closeness between voters and their parties. This closeness is usually defined as «party identification» and, with all the above qualifications, it is rather high.
The party identification concept has probably represented the most important development in contemporary electoral studies​[10]​. Most voters approach their electoral choice with a stable set of predispositions towards parties, although the conceptualisation and the measuring of these inclinations may vary according to the political and electoral context. A crucial function of party identities is that they serve as a tool to organise voters’ political assessments and judgements. For example, once a voter has developed a sense of psychological attachment to a party, he would tend to look at politics from a party perspective. Party identification therefore becomes a «perception filter », retaining favourable information and removing the conflicting one; the more solid the allegiance to a party, the stronger the selection and distortion processes. Moreover, compared to the indications that reach voters from, for example, their class position or religion, party loyalty seems to include a much wider range of political phenomena, since parties play a more central role in the political process. The indications that voters derive from their party identification constitute an efficient «decision-making shortcut»; they allow citizens to use their party identity to decide which policies to support and which to oppose.
The party identification function plays a key role especially in voting behaviour. In particular, it offers to the little sophisticated, little interested and little informed voter a clear and «cheap» instrument to decide whom to vote for. In general, party identification makes the voting decision simpler, less burdensome; it guides the individual through the complexity of politics, providing a reference framework to digest political information, understand political issues and form some political judgements. It should be added that party allegiance – in the same way as sports-related loyalties (like, for example, the allegiance to a sports team) – mobilises individuals to political participation, from going to the polls to being involved in more demanding activities. The other side of the coin – by no means a trivial one – is of course the selective process that party identification produces, that is that “filter” function mentioned earlier.
In all Western countries, party bonds have progressively weakened following social and political modernisation processes (Dalton et al. 1984; Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990). In particular, the increased educational levels have improved the average levels of cognitive resources available to citizens. Nowadays, a higher number of voters possess the individual resources and capacities that are necessary to be self-sufficient in politics. Within this framework, party identification too has experienced a long-term decline in all industrialised countries (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Bellucci 1995; Dalton 2000) and it still does not show visible signs of recovery. The Italian case falls within this general tendency, although, as we shall see, it displays some specific features of its own.








The sharp decrease recorded in 1972 is significant. In fact, the 1972 elections registered - in a political way - the deep social and cultural changes that had taken place over the last five years (movements, social conflicts, and political and ideological secularisation). They represented the real turn in Italy, the breaking point and the passage away from the traditional country that had emerged from the 1968 elections, to the «modern» country which had come out of the great transformation of the economic miracle years. Thus, it was the Seventies and certainly not the Nineties which ushered in a new political period of progressive psychological and organisational distancing from political parties by voters. This, among other things, indicates that the much deplored gap between the «real» and the «legal» country – which was the subject of so much political writing in the Seventies – was a lot narrower in that decade than in the following ones. In fact, towards the end of those years, parties still seemed to play an important linkage role with voters, who paid them back with extremely high levels of psychological identification and voting stability. This decrease has been a progressive one: after all, halfway through the following decade, almost 3/4 of Italian voters still felt political parties «close», although with less intensity than before. During the Eighties, this decrease continued quite steadily. The fading feeling of party identification turned into a real collapse from 1989, with the progressive worsening of the crisis of the political system​[13]​.
Therefore, in aggregate terms, psychological closeness to political parties in 2001 does not appear to have changed considerably compared to the previous decade. On the contrary, it should be noted that it remains stable; or rather that not only has the downward trend stopped, but that party attachment shows signs of an increased intensity.
The stabilisation of party identification in Italy is a phenomenon not to be underestimated. Firstly, and rather importantly, it distinguishes Italy from most other industrialised countries; secondly, we should not forget what the Nineties represented in terms of the crisis of the political and party system. On the contrary, one should wonder why, under these conditions, party identification has not totally collapsed. The answer is to be found in the debate on the political re-mobilisation process that followed the great crisis of the party system in the first half of the 1990’s. The creation of new political parties, the emergence of new characters on the Italian political scene, referendums and the new electoral system have in fact reinvigorated links between citizens and politics. The most significat case is constituted by Forza Italia voters, as we shall see later in this paragraph.








As a whole, the closeness to a political party does not depend solely on the correspondence between the voter and the overall ideological orientation of the party, but also - to a great extent – on the nature, the degree of institutionalisation and the organisational identity of the party itself. Data show that there are two groups of rather distinct parties in terms of voters’ identification levels. At the one end, among the largest ones, we could place the Communist Refoundation Party, the National Alliance and the Democrats of the Left, for which there is a high degree of identification. At the other end, for different reasons, we find Forza Italia, the centre-left Margherita “federation” and those parties that were created just before the 2001 elections. The first three parties represent «traditional» organisations, where emphasis should be put on both aspects, in that these are organisations and their existence – with some name variations - can be ascribed to a political tradition. As for the latter parties, while Forza Italia produces a weak party identification because, in spite of its growth (or rather because of it), it is still poorly institutionalised (also because of the overriding presence of its leader), the Margherita is substantially a composite coalition of factions that has not developed its own distinct party identity as such​[16]​.
However, although the percentage of Forza Italia – and Margherita -- voters who manifest a sense of attachment to their party is relatively low, we cannot neglect the fact that we are dealing, by definition, with neo-identified voters. These are voters who probably in the past identified with other parties – this we cannot know – and who, therefore, might have ended up (or remained) among the unidentified ones, but who seem instead to have found in this party a political identity they recognised as their own and towards which they could develop a sense of psychological attachment. Considering the magnitude of the Forza Italia electorate, the contribution that these neo-identified voters have made to the overall level of party identification is certainly decisive. In fact, if we put the total of voters who feel close to a party equal to 100 and ask them to indicate their party, as many as 29 will indicate Forza Italia, 24 the Democrats of the Left, 17 the National Alliance, and 9 Communist Refoundation. All the other parties share the remaining 20% of identified voters​[17]​. These data concerning Forza Italia voters represent a flat denial of appealing but unfounded labels such as « plastic party», «soulless party », and others, which have all too often and too easily been attached to this organisation by commentators and actors of the Italian political scene alike.
Party identification may produce different consequences. From the parties’ point of view, a low identification level may constitute a problem, since it does not guarantee them a core of stable and loyal voters. On the other hand, as is shown by the glaring example of Forza Italia (but also by the Margherita coalition), a low level of psychological closeness is by no means a hindrance to the acquisition of new shares of the electorate. On the contrary, if the voters of a given party are very «attached» to it, they may represent an obstacle to any change of the party itself, to its positioning within the political space and therefore to the acquisition of new voters. Furthermore, a very high level of psychological closeness may be a sign of the fact that that a party’s electorate is shrinking to a group of “true-blue” voters, which may tend to transform the party itself into a sect-like organisation.
On the other hand, from the individual voter’s point of view, what effects has one’s psychological closeness to a party on voting? In other words, is there a certain consistency between a voter’s attitude and behaviour? In general, as shown in table 7, the answer is yes, which means that there is a high level of consistency. The most coherently identified voters are those who vote for Forza Italia. The enthusiasm of neophytes, one might say. If Forza Italia succeeds in widening and consolidating the share of voters who are psychologically close to the party, it will greatly stabilise its consensus among citizens.




Moreover, the sense of psychological closeness to a party diminishes «vote splitting»​[20]​ considerably, thus confirming its stabilising role in voting behaviour. As Schadee and Segatti (2002) have shown, it also increased the tendency to keep one’s vote stable in the last two elections.
This stabilising function is also confirmed by the fact that, among identified voters, 85% appeared to know already what they would vote in the next political election, as opposed to a figure slightly higher than 50% among unidentified voters​[21]​. On the whole, nearly half of the Italian voters are psychologically close and, at the same time, show a voting orientation which is independent of the political situation and of the specific electoral circumstance. We are therefore approaching the domain which was once defined as «vote of belonging» [Parisi and Pasquino 1977; Parisi 1995] and which was all too hastily considered as extinguished.

4. What type of vote does the voter identify with the most?

The question of psychological closeness to a party inevitably leads us to analyse one of the key elements of the mechanism and functioning of the current electoral system. The question is obvious and unavoidable: does the voter feel more and better represented by her «majoritarian» vote for a candidate or a coalition, or by her «proportional» vote for a party? In other words, is a coalition identity forming – or is it already there - alongside or instead of a party identity?
Naturally, it should be said that, since the electors cast two votes, one could well conceive two separate identities, coexisting in a harmonious way (except, of course, for splitting votes). On the one hand, voters certainly somehow felt the bitterness of the debate concerning the merits and the demerits of both the majoritarian and the proportional electoral systems. What is more, they have been called to the polls twice for each referendum aiming at pushing the electoral system in an increasingly majoritarian direction, thus abolishing the proportional ballot for the Chamber of Deputies. On the other hand, when voters go to the polls and vote for the Chamber of Deputies, they receive two ballots: one with the names of the candidates in single-member constituencies and the other with the symbols of the parties for the so-called “proportional seat recovery” (the share of proportionally distributed Chamber seats).
The first section of the paper described how the voter, when it comes to choosing, amongst other factors, tends to be shaped a bit more by the coalition than by the party. However, as one can see by observing table 8, while nearly four voters out of six claim they identify with both types of vote, there appears to be a rather clear preference for the proportional one. In this regard, it can also be noticed that the percentage of voters claiming to identify more with the majoritarian ballot is identical to that of voters indicating the coalition as the object of their voting decision (see table 1 above). Of course, we are not claiming that the two groups coincide. However, since both concepts of «majoritarian» and «coalition» belong to the same semantic field, it appears reasonable to claim that this area, strictly speaking, corresponds to about 30% of the electorate. Voters seem to be in a transition phase: seemingly, coalition identities are there, they are consolidating and they sometimes cut across and overlap with party identities. This is a redefinition process involving Italians’ political identities, which is bound to continue for a long time to come.




Anyway, the fact is that 40% of voters claim they identify with both types of vote. How should this result be interpreted? Here, two hypotheses are submitted, both of them deserving further analysis. On the one hand, the electorate indicates that, with regard to the properties of the existing electoral system, they are more uncertain and confused, which results in their anchoring to the well-known proportional vote. However, on the other hand, this might indicate that, as things stand now, the Mattarellum (the hybrid system instituted by the Mattarella act), with its peculiar combination of majoritarian and proportional vote, seems to be substantially appreciated. This electoral system should therefore be considered – if not fully consolidated – as at least acceptable, while an increase of its majoritarian component is not deemed desirable. Whatever the right interpretation may be, it follows that the electoral system is destined to remain one of the matters under dispute not only in the institutional debate, but also in the competition among parties and coalitions.








If the voters of each party are considered, the picture takes some interesting nuances. The staunchest «majoritarian supporters» appear to be Left Democrats and Margherita voters, although to a somewhat lesser extent than the whole of Ulivo voters​[23]​:. This may help to explain why Ulivo obtains considerably better results in the majoritarian ballot than in the proportional one. Some assumptions can be made on the behaviour of the electorates of the two main Ulivo parties. Margherita voters prefer the majoritarian vote because are «devoted» to it, whereas Left Democrats voters prefer it because they are «compelled» to. The former – more precisely, a part of them (the Democrats) – traditionally support the majoritarian system, the coalition; on the contrary, part of the latter shares the opinion that the party can only have a future within a wider alliance and that this is the position worth backing.
Conversely, the staunchest supporters of the proportional vote are voters of the Communist Refoundation Party, of the “other” centre-right parties and of the National Alliance, who are also the ones who identify the least with the majoritarian vote​[24]​. The case of Communist Refoundation voters is quite obvious, while, apparently, people voting for the National Alliance and other minor centre-right parties find it hard to identify in a majoritarian vote eventually favouring the Casa delle Libertà coalition.
A totally different case is represented by Forza Italia voters. As a matter of fact, they declare they do not identify much either with the proportional vote per se or with the majoritarian one, while – in over half of the cases – they indicate a preference for both types of vote. Knowing the social and political profile of Forza Italia voters, one may safely claim that this kind of indication is to be largely ascribed to uncertainty and confusion, rather than to a conscious choice and use of the complex tool for voting and forming winning majorities.

5. Candidates: the end of the personal vote?

We have already seen that constituency candidates represent an element of choice only for a restricted segment of voters. This is by itself an unambiguous indication of the extremely little importance voters attach to the local candidate in the political competition at the constituency level.
Not only are candidates an essential factor of the majoritarian system under an institutional viewpoint; electoral systems based on single-member constituencies offer to candidates and voters alike incentives for searching and expressing what has been defined as personal vote. «The personal vote indicates the part of electoral support enjoyed by a candidate that derives from his qualities, activities, qualifications and personal achievements. The part of the vote which is not personal includes: the support given to a candidate on the basis of his belonging to a given party; voters’ characteristics, such as social class, religion and ethnicity; reactions to national contingencies such as the state of the economy and, finally, assessments on the conduct of the leader of the governing political party» (Cain et al. 1987, 9).
The importance of the personal vote should not be overrated. Only in the United States have personal factors reached a decisive importance, not only in presidential but also in congressional elections​[25]​. In other political systems, notwithstanding the great differences among them, personal factors seem to have a much lesser role. However, the importance of the personal vote cannot be underestimated either. On the contrary, its influence is now increasing. The construction of a personal electoral support becomes highly significant under very unstable electoral conditions and where voters’ loyalty is low. In addition, the importance of having a personal vote of one’s own naturally increases in marginal constituencies, where success depends on a smaller difference of votes from the other candidates. In these situations, the personal vote safeguards candidates from electoral fluctuations and, to some extent, make them more independent from the ups and downs of their party. On the other hand, the declined stability of voting behaviour and the diminished effect of structural factors in the voting decision inevitably lead to look for a personal vote, with all the consequences this might entail (creation of personal electoral machines, increased activities at the constituency level, decentralisation of political decision-making processes, and a higher degree of political particularism).
	It has been said that single-member majoritarian constituencies, in principle, offer incentives and opportunities for a personal vote and therefore for strengthening the bonds between representatives and their territory. Other factors may however intervene and modify the structure of political opportunities, as they are conceived by both candidates and voters. The most important example is the British case, where a deep-rooted national party system makes the competition within each constituency a question of alignment, structured by the competition between the two prime-ministerial candidates, a phenomenon which decidedly offsets the decentralisation trends of political processes. The possibility to build a personal electoral following decreases in those systems – like the British one - where national parties have a capacity of intra-organisational control on careers, on the availability of political resources and on the legislative behaviour of candidates/elected members (Cain et al. 1987). On the other hand, only proportional systems with large constituencies and a pure list system – like in Israel, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries – produce an incentive structure which openly discourages the development of the personal vote. In Italy – as in the French Fourth Republic – the «depersonalising» effects of the proportional systems were traditionally mitigated by the possibility to express preferences for candidates of the chosen party. In fact, the preference vote has enabled, particularly – though not exclusively – in the South of the country, the formation of wide and stable personal electoral followings. Thus, even under the old rules, the Italian voter had the possibility to express a personal vote for a single candidate through the use of preferences (or, as it happened in 1992, of only one preference); in fact, voters made an extensive use of this possibility.
	Are local candidates therefore the new actors of the electoral contest, at least at constituency level? When it comes to choosing, have Italian voters learned to consider the candidates’ personal qualities too? Not really (as shown above), at least if one considers the «demand» coming from voters. In addition to what we already know from the analysis made in the second section of the paper, when voters were asked what their motivation was when they actually expressed their voting decision​[26]​, the percentage of those who declared they were guided by the candidate is very low and appears strongly dependent on the changing character of the political supply.
	In 1994, during the first political election using the new electoral system, 34% of voters claimed they had based their choice for the constituency candidate on his individual qualities rather than the coalition that supported him. During the elections held on 21st April 1996, this percentage had already decreased by half. Only five years later, as our research shows, as few as 11% of voters declared they had voted for the candidate on the basis of his personal qualities rather than for the coalition he belonged to​[27]​. Has the «personal vote» already come to an end after its third test? 




Since it would be implausible to ascribe such change to some deep modification in voters’ basic orientations, it appears reasonable to assign it to the changed nature of the political supply. As early as 1994, it could be claimed that the political contest had taken a national character rather than a local one (that is, at the constituency level). This was so in spite of the heterogeneity of the electoral coalitions and of the serious disrepute in which had fallen the parties that in the previous forty years had «nationalised» the contest. Two elections later, it should be said that the candidates’ personal qualities virtually did not seem to have counted at all. This drop in the salience of candidates in the eyes of voters appears as a sign of their strong dependence on the type of political supply, on the format of the contest and on the strategies of the political and party élites.




Secondly, and very importantly in the context of the electoral competition, one fourth of the voters felt able to express their assessment on the work done by the elected constituency representatives, with a prevalence of favourable opinions (14% to 11%) ​[28]​. In Italy’s Southern regions, the share of voters who expressed their judgement on the constituency representative increases by as much as one third, with a slight prevalence of negative assessments. On the contrary, this figure goes down to one fifth in the North-western and North-eastern regions of the country, with a wide majority of positive assessments.
An interesting aspect of the evaluation of elected representatives is that it is positively correlated to all the indicators concerning interest in politics, institutional knowledge and information (reading of newspapers). All this may be summed up in the clear correlation between educational levels and assessment of the elected representatives. Thus, it could be claimed that at the basis of the presence/lack of assessment there is a structural factor which is connected to the cognitive capacities acquired by the electorate, rather than presumed splits between the electors and the elected.
In conclusion, although the candidate in single-member constituencies is certainly not the main driving factor in voting behaviour, the existence of candidates elected in single-member constituencies produces positive consequences. In fact, it allows politically concerned and informed voters to keep in contact with their representatives and therefore assess their conduct. This is exactly what the democratic theory and what the promoters of the referendum on the reform of the electoral system have always deemed positive both for a good political representation and for a satisfactory functioning of democracy itself.

6. The mechanisms of voting choice

In this paper, we have tried to grasp which mechanisms Italian voters used in 2001 to make their voting choices. We asked what they voted for to explain whom they voted for.
We have seen that, except for the constituency candidate, voters’ decisions have been guided by all the «objects» proposed in a quite evenly distributed manner. In other words, at the time of choosing for the majoritarian ballot (or in the related process of choice formation), voters of the 2001 elections used four practically equally important cognitive shortcuts.
Using a metaphor, we could say that the Italian voters’ cognitive map is made up of four equally sized areas, with a slight prevalence of the coalition factor alone. Voters move within these «mental territories» to decide which choice to make when voting. These territories have a peculiar conformation of their own, which, in its turn, structures and influences voters’ choice alternative on the basis of the stimuli and the proposals coming from political actors. Voters are not drawn to these territories accidentally: some individual characteristics drive them towards one or the other. The population distribution in various territories, as it were, is important because it delimits and shapes the voters’ choice field. In this sense, the different parts of the cognitive map constitute a source of electoral segmentation. For example, we know that the characteristics of coalition leaders have had an impact on voters’ choice. However, this result should be read in the light of the fact that only one fifth of the Italians who went to the polls «voted for» the coalition leader. The same reasoning can be applied, to give another example, to political proposals. Although it is undoubtedly an important guide for the voter’s choice, less than one fourth of the electorate «voted for» the programme. In other words, the various factors influencing the voters’ electoral behaviour display their effects only within each of these territories. Consequently, these factors will have a different impact according to the object of choice that the voter has in mind.
In this regard, we have highlighted that among the voters of the two main competing cartels two decision models, based on clearly differentiated elements, prevail. Among CdL supporters, the coalition leader and the political programme are the factors that predominantly shaped their voting decision. Conversely, among Ulivo voters, the prevailing factors influencing voters’ choices appear to be very different ones, the coalition and the favourite party. With regard to this point, it should be stressed that the real unifying element, as far as the “objects” of voter’s choice in favour of the Ulivo coalition are concerned, is the coalition itself. To the eyes of these voters, this appears as the authentic added value of this alliance, thus supporting the opinions of those centre-left representatives who consider the coalition as the real – and, for the time being, the only – strength of the Ulivo cartel. This may also contribute to explain why the Ulivo fared better in the majoritarian ballot compared to the sum of the results obtained by the parties composing it in the proportional one.
Although the traditional social correlates of voting behaviour (religion, social class, territory) now have a much weaker influence, voters still do not seem to be inclined towards an individualisation of their choices on new bases. Thus, in spite of these changed conditions, most voters seem to keep on choosing on the basis of rather traditional schemata (parties and coalitions), which are still predominantly dependent on some general political and ideological stances and assessments.
Political parties and coalitions – as they function as cognitive shortcuts – play a crucial role in organising voters’ political assessments and judgements. For example, once a voter has developed a sense of psychological attachment to a party, he would tend to see politics from a party perspective. Identification with a party or a coalition thus becomes a « perceptive filter » through which the voter selects and shapes his political orientations. In general, «looking at» the party or at the coalition makes the voting decision simpler, less tiresome and less demanding; it guides the individual through the complexity of politics and provides a reference framework to process political information, understand political issues and form some political judgements. As a cognitive guide, the party is surely more established and better defined, whereas the coalition is a more indefinite, more nuanced and less consolidated information shortcut, which therefore requires more resources on the part of the voter.
As this paper has shown, even educated and politically sophisticated voters use some traditional shortcuts like the party or the coalition. The most complex cognitive schema, that is the evalution of policies and political issues - which requires a higher level of competence and intellectual mobilisation - is still utilised by a minority of citizens. On the contrary, less sophisticated voters rely on coalition leaders. Candidates – one of the supposed new elements of the choice mechanisms – play a residual role and are little used in the voting decision-making process. It appears that “issue voting” has not managed to widen its domain, whereas “identity voting” still retains its hold, in spite of everything. The substantial stability of the majoritarian vote in the passage from the 1996 to the 2001 elections could be largely explained in these terms. Italian voters’ choice mechanisms still appear to be solidly attached to traditional elements and quite distant from post-modern trends towards the individualisation of voting decisions. Using a small paradox, one could say that the “newest” voters on the Italian political scene are those who turn their attention to the figure of the coalition leader to draw some indications on whom they should vote for.
In addition, it should also be considered that, as has been observed, Italian voters, in spite of everything, still feel better represented by their proportional vote rather than by the majoritarian one. Or rather, that coalition identities, being different from party identities or from a lack of any form of identification at all, still concern only a relative minority of the Italian electorate. Change appears slippery and slow, at least where it involves the structures and the deep mechanisms that lead to electoral choices.
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Il leader della coalizione	21,8
Il partito da lei preferito	21,9





Table 2	Distribuzione percentuale delle motivazioni del voto maggioritario secondo la coalizione e il partito votati alla Camera (valori percentuali)



















Table 3	 Motivazioni del voto maggioritario secondo alcune variabili sociodemografiche (valori percentuali)































Table 4 	Motivazioni del voto maggioritario secondo alcune variabili di mobilitazione cognitiva ed esposizione ai mass media (valori percentuali)

	La coalizione	Il leader della coalizione	Il partito preferito	Il candidato nel collegio	Il programma	Totale	(N)
							










































Da 10001 a 100000	57,4	42,6	100	(1337)













Interesse per la politicaa				
Alto	79,6	20,4	100	(928)
Basso	46,7	53,3	100	(2181)


























Lista Di Pietro - Italia dei valori	46,2	53,8	100	(52)
Lista Bonino\Radicali	39,5	60,5	100	(38)
Democrazia europea - D Antoni	34,6	65,4	100	(26)

a I partiti sono ordinati per livello di identificazione

Table 7  Partito votato alla Camera secondo il partito al quale ci si sente vicini (valori percentuali)

	Partito al quale ci si sente vicini
					










Il Girasole (Verdi - Sdi)	0,4	0,6			
Lista Bonino\Radicali	0,4		0,2		
Lista Di Pietro - Italia dei valori	0,4		0,2	3,8	0,8
Fiamma tricolore	0,8		0,2		






Nota: Sono stati presi in considerazione solo i partiti con almeno 50 casi. Nel caso de La Margherita (partito votato) sono stati aggregati gli elettori che hanno dichiarato di sentirsi vicini a I Democratici, Partito popolare, La Margherita/Rutelli. In grassetto le percentuali di elettori “coerenti”.






Tutti e due allo stesso modo	38,0
Totale	100
N	(2289)
«Lei ha dato due voti per la Camera: lei mi ha detto che nel maggioritario ha votato per … e nel proporzionale per … . Fra questi due voti qual è quello nel quale si riconosce di più?»






























Table 10 Tipo di voto nel quale l’elettore si riconosce maggiormente per coalizione e partito votati (valori percentuali)

	Tipo di voto nel quale l’elettore si riconosce
	Maggioritario	Proporzionale	Entrambi allo stesso modo	Totale	(N)












Altri (Bonino, Di-P., D'A.)	23,3	20,9	55,8	100	(129)


Table 11  Motivo del voto al candidato (valori percentuali)

	1994	1996	2001
 Lo schieramento che lo proponeva	54,0	71,9	67,1
 Le sue qualità  individuali	35,7	19,2	11,2




Nota: i dati 94 e 96 provengono dalle indagini Itanes relative alle due elezioni. 

Table 12. Modalità di contatto con eletti ("In questo collegio cinque anni fa è stata eletto l'on. … del …. Mi può dire se Lei, di questo deputato …") (valori percentuali)

	
Ne ha sentito parlare da altri	36,7
Lo ha visto alla televisione	27,9
Ha letto di lui su giornali o riviste	27,2
Ha ricevuto da lui posta (o gliene ha inviata)	16,7
Lo ha incontrato personalmente	10,3









Figure 1 Elettori vicini a un partito, vari anni (percentuali)


Fonti: 	1968: Italian Mass Election Survey 1968, diretta da Samuel H. Barnes, file originale dei dati
1972: Italian Mass Election Survey 1972, diretta da Samuel H. Barnes e Giacomo Sani, file originale dei dati
1975: Political Action. An Eight Nation Study, coordinata da Samuel H. Barnes, file originale dei dati
1990: Itanes, file originale dei dati 








Figure 2 Intensità della vicinanza a un partito, vari anni (percentuali)






^1	  The question asked was the following: «You have therefore voted for ... Did this choice mainly depend on...». The possible answers were: 1) The coalition; 2) The coalition leader; 3) The political party you favour; 4) The candidate in your constituency; 5) The programme; 6) To contrast Mr. Berlusconi; 7) Another reason. The last two answers were not considered in the analysis because of their negligible number (9 and 16 respectively). This also proves the exhaustiveness of the alternatives proposed to the respondents.
^2	  As an illustration, we are showing the answers to a similar question that were recorded by Samuel Barnes and Giacomo Sani in a survey following the 1972 political elections: political party 51.0 ; candidates 13.0; programme 24.7; party leader, 11.3 (N = 1626).
^3	  The local candidates too play a proportionally greater role among National Alliance voters, according to a consolidated model of right-wing notables.
^4	  On the contrary, quite surprisingly, Communist Refoundation voters give a little more weight to Mr. Francesco Rutelli’s figure in their choice.
^5	  According to Parisi’s estimate (1995), which was reached following an elaborate procedure. The 'voto d'opinione' (a 'vote expressive of an opinion') is the «expression of a choice that accepts as a framework of options, the programmatic aims espoused by the contending parties » (Parisi and Pasquino 1977, 221).
^6	  The statistical technique used to perform this operation of simultaneously checking several variables is the multinomial logistic regression. The reference category of the dependent variable is «the programme». The results of this statistical processing are not shown here in full in order to avoid text overload.
^7	  Beta coefficients = 0.54 both for elementary school certificates and for junior secondary school degrees (standard error of 0.29 and 0.26 respectively).
^8	  On the contrary, neither the candidates nor the programme seem to be affected by the two variables considered
^9	  Furthermore, voters with an expressed interest in politics are less likely to be guided by the coalition leader (b = -0.25; standard error = 0.16.
^10	  Starting from the ground-breaking study by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes [1960].
^11	  Data concerning 1968 derive from a research carried out by Samuel Barnes on the occasion of that year’s political elections (for an analysis of the results, please refer to Barnes 1977).
^12	  The question asked to respondents in 2001 was the following: "Is there a political party to which you feel closer than others?"
^13	  It should however be noted that this is by no means an Italian peculiarity (see Bellucci 1995; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). 
^14	  This is linked, among other things, to the decline of the closeness to a political party among young people. Again, this phenomenon is noticeable in Italy too, although to a much lesser extent than in other Western countries.
^15	  It should also be noted that almost 70% of those who do not know / remember / answer the question on the proportional vote do not feel close to any party.
^16	  The case of the Margherita formation is probably yet another demonstration, and confutation, of the importance of leadership in initiating and consolidating mechanisms and processes of psychological identification.
^17	  The case of the Margherita formation, to prove what stated above, is phenomenal. It gathers only 1% of identified voters, whereas both Partito Popolare (2.5%) and the Democrats (2.3%) fared better.
^18	  However, we cannot exclude that those are voters with a « transition identity», that is voters progressively distancing themselves from old party loyalties to embrace new ones.
^19	  We have also aggregated in this group those voters who declared they felt close not to single parties but directly to the Margherita formation.
^20	  This expression indicates a discrepancy between the preferences expressed in the majoritarian and in the proportional ballots.
^21	  The question asked was the following: «Imagine that, in a few months’ time, political elections are called again. Do you already know who you would vote for?».
^22	  In fact, if we consider the answer “both in the same way”, the beta coefficients of the logistical regression concerning holders of medium to low educational qualifications compared to those of voters with at least a senior secondary school degree appear to be negative both in the option favouring the majoritarian vote (-0.384) and in the one favouring the proportional vote (-0.374).
^23	  This difference is explained by the increased tendency by other centre-left party voters to indicate the majoritarian vote as the one they identify with the most. This tendency also concerns those voters who said they did not remember or did not answer question on what they had voted in the proportional segment (and who, for the most part, identify with the majoritarian vote).
^24	  One should notice how, among voters of parties stemming from pre-existing organisations, only those who now vote for the Left Democrats are more attracted by the majoritarian vote.
^25	  On the rising centrality of candidates in US presidential elections, see Wattenberg [1991]. On the personal vote in the election of Congress members, see Mann and Wolfinger [1988].
^26	  With reference to the candidate voted in the majoritarian ballot, interviewees were asked the following question: «Did you mainly vote for the coalition proposing him or for his individual qualities?».
^27	  On the «personal vote» in the 1994 and the 1996 elections, see Maraffi [1997].
^28	  In the interview, interviewees were asked to give a judgement on the conduct of the member of Parliament elected in that constituency in 1996, after mentioning his/her name («How do you judge the conduct of this MP? »).
